Tuesday, July 30, 2019
Gabriel Alvarez Essay
The Ninth Circuit believed that because respondentsââ¬â¢ donning and doffing is an vital and necessary preliminary activity included by respondentsââ¬â¢ principal work activity, all activities performed afterward such as walking accordingly occur during the ââ¬Ëprincipalââ¬â¢ workday and is compensable. The court rejected the petitionerââ¬â¢s argument that Section 4(a)(1) of the Portal Act makes clear that the walking time at issue is not compensable even if it follows clothes changing. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the employees of IBP, Inc. because putting on protective gear and walking to and from changing areas are ââ¬Å"integral and indispensableâ⬠to the jobââ¬â¢s ââ¬Å"principal activitiesâ⬠. ISSUE(S) The issues presented to the Supreme Court for determination were whether the time spent walking between donning and doffing areas and workstations, and the time spent waiting to put on protective equipment were compensable under the FLSA as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Supreme Court held that time spent walking following putting on protective equipment and prior to removing protective equipment was compensable under the FLSA as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act REASON(S) The Court held that any activity that ââ¬Å"is ââ¬Ëintegral and indispensableââ¬â¢ to a ââ¬Ëprincipal activityââ¬â¢ is itself a ââ¬Ëprincipal activityââ¬â¢ under section 4(a)(1) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment